Tag Archives: PIP statute

How Billing Processes of Florida Medical Providers for PIP Claims are Affected by the Thirty Third Amendment to Regulation 83 Under New York-Based Insurance Policies

The New York State Department of Financial Services (“DFS’) has finalized the Thirty-Third Amendment to Regulation 83 (the “33rd Amendment”), which was published in the State Register on October 25, 2017 and will affect treatment rendered on or after January 23, 2018. Pursuant to the accompanying press release, the 33rd Amendment is designed to “limit the amount that insurers can reimburse for healthcare services performed outside of New York State under its no-fault insurance law.”[1] By limiting reimbursement amounts for out-of-state no-fault healthcare services, which are treating New York State (“NYS”) residents, the DFS intends to “curb costs and abuses” by out-of-state medical providers charging excessive rates.[2].

Regulation 83, governing the reimbursement of out-of-state providers, previously provided that:

“If a professional health service is performed outside New York State, the permissible charge for such service shall be the prevailing fee in the geographic location of the provider.” (11 NYCRR § 68.6).

The case of Surgicare Surgical Assoc. v National Interstate Ins. Co., 2014 WL 6610048, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24362) (Anthony Cannataro, J.), provides a good example of an out-of-state provider seeking reimbursement at an exorbitant rate, diminishing the coverage available to the insured for other medically necessary services. There, the provider performed arthroscopic surgery on a covered person in New Jersey and submitted a claim for reimbursement under the applicable New York No-fault policy. Although the state of New Jersey has a fee schedule that applies to the reimbursement of medical services under the New Jersey’s No-fault law, the provider submitted a bill to the insurer for approximately $5,000 more than the amount it would have been reimbursed had the claim involved a New Jersey auto policy and as a result, was governed by the New Jersey fee schedule. The insurer reimbursed the amount permitted under the New Jersey fee schedule, essentially maintaining that, pursuant to Regulation 83, the New Jersey fee scheduled reflected the permissible amount in the geographic area. The provider sued for the difference. After discussing the applicable regulations and policy considerations behind the enactment of the New York No-fault law, including the legislative intent of cost containment, a New York City Civil Court judge held that, “when services are rendered outside of New York but in a jurisdiction which utilizes a fee schedule, the insurer complies with Section 68.6 by paying the ‘permissible’ charge for that particular medical service, that is, the amount permitted by that jurisdiction’s fee schedule.” The provider appealed and the Appellate Term affirmed. See Surgicare Surgical Assoc. v National Interstate Ins. Co., 2015 NY Slip Op 25338 (App. Term 1st Dept. 2015).

In other instances, the amount sought by out-of-state providers has been tens of thousands of dollars above the amount that would be permitted under the New York Fee Schedule. Recognizing the potential for fraud and abuse, the Amendment provides an effective solution to the exploitation of the No-fault system by out-of-state providers and, adopts, to some extent, the holding in Surgicare and, by regulation, strengthens the limits placed on reimbursement of such providers. Specifically, the Amendment states:

11 NYCRR 68.6: Health services performed outside New York State

(a)(1) If a professional health service reimbursable under [section 5102(a)(1) of the] Insurance Law section 5102(a)(1) is performed outside this State, the amount that the insurer shall reimburse for the service shall be the lower of the amount charged by the provider and the prevailing fee in the geographic location of the provider with respect to services:

(i) that constitute emergency care;

(ii) provided to an eligible injured person that is not a resident of this State; or

(iii) provided to an eligible injured person that is a resident of this State who, at the time of treatment, is residing in the jurisdiction where the treatment is being rendered for reasons unrelated to the treatment.

(2) For purposes of this subdivision, emergency care means all medically necessary treatment initiated within 48 hours of a motor vehicle accident for a traumatic injury or a medical condition resulting from the accident, which injury or condition manifests itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity such that absence of immediate attention could reasonably be expected to result in: death; serious impairment to bodily functions; or serious dysfunction of a bodily organ or part.  Medically necessary treatment shall include immediate pre-hospitalization care, transportation to a hospital or trauma center, emergency room care, surgery, critical and acute care.  Emergency care extends during the period of initial hospitalization until the patient is discharged from the hospital.

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (a) of this section, if a professional health service reimbursable under Insurance Law section 5102(a)(1) is performed outside this State with respect to an eligible injured person that is a resident of this State, the amount that the insurer shall reimburse for the service shall be the lowest of:

(1) the amount of the fee set forth in the region of this State that has the highest applicable amount in the fee schedule for that service;

(2) the amount charged by the provider; and

(3) the prevailing fee in the geographic location of the provider.

(c) If the jurisdiction in which the treatment is being rendered has established a fee schedule for reimbursing health services rendered in connection with claims for motor vehicle-related injuries and the fee schedule applies to the service being provided, the prevailing fee amount specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section shall be the amount prescribed in that jurisdiction’s fee schedule for the respective service.

The 33rd Amendment separates treatment by out-of-state medical providers into the following two categories:

  1. Out-of-state medical services, which (a) constitute emergency care[3], (b) are provided to non-NYS residents, and (c) are provided to patients with a NYS domicile, who are currently living in the state where the treatment is being rendered, for reasons unrelated to the accident.
  2. Out-of-state medical services provided to a NYS resident, currently living in NYS.

There is one main difference between the two categories – which State’s no-fault fee schedule governs and must be utilized by the insurer when reimbursing the medical provider. Simply put, if the medical services fall into Category 1, the medical provider’s reimbursement will be capped at the No-Fault Schedule rate for the State and region wherein the services are provided. By contrast, if the medical services fall into Category 2, the medical provider’s reimbursement will be capped at the highest rate available under the New York State No-Fault Fee Schedule unless the State where the treatment is being rendered has an established fee schedule for claims related to motor vehicle-related injuries.

As such, section (c) of 11 NYCRR 68.6 would apply to medical services rendered in Florida as there is an established set of fee schedules within the Florida No-Fault Law. While the foregoing may be the general rule, there are nuances requiring attention.

The reimbursement rate for medical services is now capped at the prevailing fee in the geographical location of the provider unless the provider charges less. Thus, the 33rd Amendment now limits the prevailing geographical rate to that area’s local No-Fault Fee Schedule Rate. In other words, if x-ray services are performed in Miami, Florida the provider’s reimbursement is limited to the schedule of maximum charges as listed in the Florida No-Fault law for that geographical region (Miami) (i.e, 200% of Medicare Part B).

The medical providers and insurers also need to be familiar with the amendment’s definition of what constitutes “emergency care”’ and how it relates to reimbursement.

Example 1: If a person is transported to the Hospital as a result of a motor vehicle accident in Florida and that person lives in Florida but is covered by a New York policy, then that Hospital provider’s charges would be limited to 75% of the usual and customary charge pursuant to the Florida No-Fault Law’s schedule of maximum charges. Moreover, the emergency services doctor would be paid at its usual and customary charge which is generally the submitted charge.

Example 2: Compare to the facts that this same individual is involved in a motor vehicle accident in Florida on January 1, 2019 and is not transported to the Hospital. However, three days later they decide to go to the emergency room due to having neck and back pain related to the accident. Would these Hospital and physician services now be considered “emergency care”?  Under this amendment, it would not because the treatment was not initiated within 48 hours following the accident.

Now further compare these facts with the applicable schedule of maximum charges under Florida Statute §627.736(5) (2018) which states in pertinent part:

The insurer may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the following schedule of maximum charges:

a. For emergency transport and treatment by providers licensed under chapter 401, 200 percent of Medicare.

b. For emergency services and care provided by a hospital licensed under chapter 395, 75 percent of the hospital’s usual and customary charges.

c. For emergency services and care as defined by s. 395.002 provided in a facility licensed under chapter 395 rendered by a physician or dentist, and related hospital inpatient services rendered by a physician or dentist, the usual and customary charges in the community.

d. For hospital inpatient services, other than emergency services and care, 200 percent of the Medicare Part A prospective payment applicable to the specific hospital providing the inpatient services.

e. For hospital outpatient services, other than emergency services and care, 200 percent of the Medicare Part A Ambulatory Payment Classification for the specific hospital providing the outpatient services.

In the situation listed in Example 2, the patient’s condition would not be considered “emergency care” and thus, payment would be made at 200 percent of the Medicare Part A prospective payment applicable to the specific hospital providing the inpatient services or 200 percent of the Medicare Part A Ambulatory Payment Classification for the specific hospital providing the outpatient services.

Conclusion

In order to maximize recovery without running afoul of the new fee schedule mandates of the 33rd Amendment, Florida medical providers treating patients covered by New York No-Fault policies must be cognizant of whether the service rendered meets the definition of “emergency care.” What this amendment does clarify is that if medical services are rendered in Florida under a PIP claim brought under a New York policy, then the maximum amount to be paid to the medical providers for these services would be limited to Florida’s schedule of maximum charges.

[1] Press Release, posted October 10, 2017, http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1710101.htm

[2] Id.

[3] Under the 33rd Amendment, in order to constitute emergency care, the treatment must be initiated within 48 hours of the motor vehicle accident.

This article is not intended to create an attorney-client relationship by offering this information, and anyone’s review of the information shall not be deemed to create such a relationship. The content provided is intended to provide information of general interest to the public and is not intended to offer legal advice about specific situations or problems. You should consult a lawyer with regard to specific law issues that require attention.

For additional information, please contact Stephen Mellor of Roig Lawyers at 954-354-1541 or by email at smellor@roiglawyers.com.php73-37.phx1-1.websitetestlink.com. Stephen G. Mellor is a partner in the Deerfield Beach office of Roig Lawyers who primarily focuses on out-of-state policy claims for insurance carriers. 

Filed under Personal Injury Protection (PIP)

1st DCA Upholds Allstate Use of Medical Fee Schedules

In an opinion filed March 18, 2015, Florida’s First District Court of Appeal held that language in an Allstate Insurance Co. policy gave sufficient notice to an assignee of its election to use Medicare fee schedules to limit benefit reimbursements under a PIP policy. Stand-Up MRI of Tallahassee, an assignee of 14 named insureds, sued Allstate in county court, contending that Allstate’s alleged failure to give adequate notice was contrary to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Geico v. Virtual Imaging. The trial court agreed with Stand-Up MRI and certified a question of great public importance to the Appellate Court.

In Virtual Imaging, as here, an MRI provider had supplied services and then disputed the insurer’s authority to limit reimbursements under Medicare fee schedules. Pursuant to the Florida PIP statute, automobile insurers are required to provide PIP coverage for 80 percent of all “reasonable expenses” for medically necessary services.

The dispute here centers on whether Allstate’s policy language provided adequate notice of its election to limit reimbursements via the Medicare fee schedules or if, as Stand-Up MRI contends, the policy fails because it is ambiguous. Allstate points to the following language in the policy as having satisfied the Virtual Imaging notice requirement:

In accordance with the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, [Allstate] will pay to or on behalf of the injured person the following benefits. . . .

Medical Expenses

Eighty percent of reasonable expenses for medically necessary … services. …

Any amounts payable under this coverage shall be subject to any and all limitations, authorized by section 627.736, or any other provisions of the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, as enacted, amended or otherwise continued in the law, including, but not limited to, all fee schedules.

The appellate court agreed with Allstate, concluding that the policy gives sufficient notice of its election to limit reimbursements by use of the fee schedules. In making its decision, the court pointed to language in the policy stating that reimbursements “shall” be subject to the limitations of §627.736, including “all fee schedules.”

Section 627.736(5)(a) 2 refers to Medicare fee schedule-based limitations and provides that insurers “may limit reimbursement to 80 percent of the … schedule of maximum charges.” Thus, concluded the court, the notice requirement was satisfied by Allstate’s language limiting “any amounts payable” to the fee schedule-based limitations found in the statute.

Furthermore, the court also distinguished the language in Allstate’s policy from that found deficient in Virtual Imaging. There, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Geico’s policy failed to “indicate in any way” that it intended to limit its reimbursement amounts using the fee schedules. Here, Allstate’s policy expressly limits reimbursements by “all fee schedules” in the statute, satisfying the Virtual Imaging notice requirement.

Stand-Up MRI also contended that Allstate’s use of the phrase “subject to . . . all fee schedules” fails to provide sufficient notice that reimbursements will always be limited by the fee schedules, arguing that “subject to” means only that Allstate had the option to limit reimbursements per the Medicare fee schedule , not that it would so limit reimbursements. The court, however, found no such ambiguity, stating that the language of the policy makes reimbursements subordinate to the fee schedule in “rather unmistakable terms.”

In sum, the court concluded that Allstate’s policy language gave legally sufficient notice to its insureds of its election to use the Medicare fee schedules as required by Virtual Imaging. The trial court’s decision was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

The cases cited are listed below for reference.

Allstate Fire and Casualty Ins. v. Stand-Up MRI of Tallahassee, Case No. 1D14-1213, et al., 1st DCA Fla. (March 18, 2015).

Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Virtual Imaging Servs. Inc., 141 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 2013).

Filed under Uncategorized

The 11th Judicial Circuit Court Issues Key Ruling in Health Care Clinic Licensure Case

On March 10, 2015, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County issued a ruling in favor of Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance in a mandatory licensing (House Bill 119) case. The Court found that the charges submitted for Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits to Imperial Fire & Casualty, to be unlawful and thus, noncompensable pursuant to Florida’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law.

Imperial Fire & Casualty issued a policy of automobile insurance to the Insured under which the Defendant, Magic Hands Solutions Inc. sought payment. Magic Hands Solutions operated as a medical clinic and allegedly rendered medical treatment to the Insured who was injured in an automobile accident. Subsequently, Magic Hands Solutions submitted charges for payment of PIP benefits to Imperial Fire & Casualty. Magic Hands Solutions was advised that the claim submitted for PIP benefits was not payable because the clinic was not properly licensed pursuant to Section 627.736, Florida Statutes (2013).

In 2012, the Legislature required mandatory licensing for all clinics holding an exempt status, whether by issuance of Certificate of Exemption or self-determined, in order for clinics to receive reimbursement pursuant to the “PIP Statute.” Hence, a clinic must be licensed under Part X, Chapter 400 to receive reimbursement for PIP benefits, unless it qualifies for an exception listed in Section 627.736(5)(h).

The Court found that the Magic Hands Solutions being wholly owned by a license massage therapist does not qualify for any of the exceptions delineated in §627.736(5)(h)(1)-(6) and was required to obtain a Health Care Clinic license as a condition precedent to receiving reimbursement of PIP benefits.

As a result of Magic Hands Solutions’ failure to obtain a Health Care Clinic License, the Court found that the charges submitted were unlawful and thus, noncompensable pursuant to Florida’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law and that Imperial Fire & Casualty.

Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company vs. Magic Hands Solution Inc., Case No. 2014-2211 CC 24 (01) (Fla. 11th Circuit March 10, 2015).

Filed under Uncategorized

11th Circuit Appellate Division Rules Insurer’s Adjuster Notes not Discoverable

On January 5, 2015, the Appellate Division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County issued a ruling reversing the lower court’s order compelling production of the insurer’s pre-litigation documents.  The court held that such documents are not discoverable in a first-party coverage lawsuit between the insured and the insurer.

In 2011, respondent Yesenia Romero sued State Farm for PIP benefits, alleging State Farm breached the insurance contract and violated the Florida PIP statute in not paying for claims resulting from a 2009 motor vehicle accident. Romero filed a request for State Farm’s “entire claims file concerning the case,” including all of the adjuster’s notes made prior to the pre-suit demand letter.  State Farm objected to the production, asserting work-product privilege.

A hearing on the issue was held in the trial court.  Following an in camera inspection of the adjuster’s notes, the judge determined that they were not protected under the work-product doctrine because they were not prepared in anticipation of litigation.  The court ordered State Farm to produce all the adjuster’s notes.  State Farm sought to have the appellate division quash the order.

In its analysis, the appellate division noted that all three levels of Florida’s judiciary, including its own court, have said that an insurance company’s claims file documents are not discoverable in a first-party coverage and damages lawsuit between an insurer and the insured. The court cited a Third District case, Castle Key v. Benitez, in concluding that “where the insured is not seeking a bad faith claim, but rather seeks relief for breach of contract,” the insurer’s claims file documents are not discoverable.

In this case, where the plaintiff was alleging breach of contract and not bad faith, the appellate division determined that the trial court erred in ordering State Farm to produce the documents and therefore quashed the trials court’s order.

State Farm v. Yesenia Romero, Case No. 13-48 AP (Fla. 11th Circuit January 5, 2015).

Castle Key Ins. Co. v. Benitez, 124 So. 3d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Filed under Uncategorized

Eleventh Circuit Dismisses PIP Case Involving EMC and Massage Therapy

A class action suit filed by plaintiff Accumed Chiropractic against Progressive Select Insurance was dismissed on July 31, 2014 by Circuit Court Judge Antonio Arzola. Judge Arzola concluded that the action was inappropriate for class action treatment.

The suit was brought on behalf of plaintiff itself and two putative classes. The first class was to be anyone who was denied payment by Progressive under PIP or MedPay insurance coverage where Progressive’s denial was based on an assertion that an Emergency Medical Condition for the insured was not established.

The second class was to be defined as anyone whose PIP or MedPay claim was denied because the health care service was for massage therapy or acupuncture. Plaintiff sought both declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract.

Plaintiff stipulated at the hearing that it did not have standing to sue for MedPay benefits. As for the PIP claims, Judge Arzola found that the “necessary and individualized questions associated with the underlying PIP claims of the class will predominate in this Action.” As a matter of law, therefore, plaintiff’s case could not proceed as a class action, and the complaint was dismissed without prejudice.

The case is Accumed Chiropractic & Wellness Center, Inc. v. Progressive Select Insurance Company, Case No. 13-CA-029396 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct., July 31, 2014). Click on the link to view the court order.

Filed under Uncategorized

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Granted with Prejudice in PIP Benefits Case Involving Challenge to “Emergency Medical Condition” (EMC) Provision

In a second ruling within one week involving Florida’s amended PIP law, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed a case challenging reimbursement under the amended statute’s “emergency medical condition” or “EMC” provision. See our earlier post titled Court Grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in Robbins v. Garrison P & C.

Sendy Enivert sued her auto insurance company, Progressive Select, alleging breach of contract for failing to pay her PIP benefits to a limit of $10,000. Enivert’s claim involved the newly added provision to Florida’s PIP law which limits PIP benefits depending on whether a claimant has suffered an emergency medical condition.

Plaintiff Enivert interpreted this language to mean that an insured is limited to $2,500 only if a medical provider determines that there is no emergency medical condition. She argued that because, in her case, no medical provider ever made such a determination, she was entitled to the full $10,000. In other words, because no medical provider determined that she did not have an emergency medical condition, she was entitled to full benefits.

Defendant Progressive read the statute to mean the opposite, i.e., that a medical provider must affirmatively determine that an emergency medical condition does exist in order for the insured to be eligible for reimbursement of the full amount.

The court agreed with Progressive, concluding that the PIP statute clearly indicates that a determination that a claimant has suffered an emergency medical condition is required in order to receive benefits in excess of the $2,500 limit. Since a medical provider did not determine that Enivert had an emergency medical condition, she was not entitled to the full $10,000 in benefits.

The court also looked to the legislative intent behind the PIP statute. It concluded that the clear legislative intent was to decrease PIP fraud by placing more stringent requirements in order to receive the maximum amount of benefits.

Based on the above, the court granted Progressive’s motion to dismiss Enivert’s case.

The case is Sendy Enivert v. Progressive Select Insurance Co., Civil Action No. 14-CV-80279-Ryskamp/Hopkins (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2014). Click on the link to read the court ruling.

Filed under Uncategorized

Court Grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss in Robbins v. Garrison P & C

On July 18, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed a case in which the plaintiff challenged reimbursement under the amended statute’s “emergency medical condition” (“EMC”) provision.

Glenaan Robbins sued her auto insurer, Garrison P&C Insurance Co., alleging that Garrison violated the 2013 provision of Florida’s PIP law that limits PIP benefits depending on a determination of whether or not the claimant suffered an emergency medical condition.

Robbins sustained injuries in an April 2013 car accident. She was treated for her injuries and alleged that ultimately “no determination was made that she did not have an emergency medical condition.” When Robbins submitted her claim to her insurer Garrison, Garrison limited her reimbursement to $2,500.

FL PIP law requires that an insurance company must reimburse its injured insured up to $10,000 if certain medical providers determine that the injured person had an emergency medical condition. Reimbursement is limited to $2,500 if a provider determines that the injured person did not have an emergency medical condition.

In this case, no determination was made either way that an emergency medical condition did or did not exist. Plaintiff Robbins argued that where there has been no such determination, insurance companies must reimburse medical expenses up to $10,000. In other words, unless a determination of no emergency medical condition is made, the plaintiff is entitled to the higher amount.

Reviewing the language of the statute and legislative intent, however, the court concluded that Robbins’ argument had no merit. Rather, where there has been no determination of an emergency medical condition made, PIP medical benefits are not to exceed $2,500. Thus, contrary to Robbins’ argument, the conclusion of the court was that unless there is a determination of an emergency condition, the reimbursement is limited to $2,500.

The court therefore held that Robbins had failed to allege a statutory claim and her case was dismissed.

The case is Glenaan Robbins v. Garrison Property & Casualty Insurance Co., Civil Action No. 13-81259-Civ-Scola (S.D. Fla. July 18, 2014). Click on the link to read the court ruling.

Filed under Uncategorized

Motion for Rehearing of Florida PIP Injunction is Denied

On November 26, 2013, the First District Court of Appeals dismissed a motion for rehearing on its October ruling to reverse an injunction placed on reforms to Florida’s PIP system. The reforms, contained within HB 119 and signed into law by Gov. Rick Scott in 2012, ban PIP payments to acupuncturists and massage therapists. The reforms also require that claimants seek treatment from a physician or hospital within 14 days of an accident.

A group of acupuncturists, massage therapists, and chiropractors filed for an injunction, which was ultimately granted. The Court of Appeals ruled in October that the injunction should be reversed. It upheld this decision by denying a motion for rehearing on its ruling.

We wrote in September about reservations expressed by a three-judge panel from the 1st District Court of Appeals regarding the challenge made by acupuncturists, massage therapists and chiropractors to key parts of Florida’s 2012 landmark reform of the personal-injury protection (PIP) auto insurance law, in a blog post titled “Judges Question Challenges Brought to Florida’s No Fault Insurance Law.”

Filed under Uncategorized

Judges Question Challenges Brought to Florida’s No Fault Insurance Law

A three-judge panel from the 1st District Court of Appeals expressed their reservations Tuesday about a challenge made by acupuncturists, massage therapists and chiropractors to key parts of Florida’s 2012 landmark reform of the personal-injury protection (PIP) auto insurance law, The News Service of Florida reports.

In the hearing, the three judges questioned how the modifications to the longstanding no-fault insurance system have diminished individual medical coverage or court access, as the Florida PIP Defense Fund and its representatives contend.

In the hearing, the three judges questioned the Florida PIP Defense Fund’s assertions that modifications to the longstanding no-fault insurance system have diminished individual medical coverage or court access.

The FL PIP Defense Fund named acupuncturist Robin Myers, chiropractor Gregory Zwirn and massage therapists Sherry Smith and Carrie Damaska as plaintiffs in the suit, as well as “Jane Doe,” which is being seen as a tactic by The Fund to qualify for standing in the case and represent individuals injured by motor-vehicle collisions.

According to Judge T. Kent Wetherell, this is not a real lawsuit, but a situation where an individual makes a claim against their own insurance company because many accidents conclude with no driver being found ‘at fault.’

The judges expressed a desire to expedite a ruling, but no timeline was given for a decision on the state’s request to overturn a temporary injunction that was imposed on certain parts of the law in March.

The 2012 reform law signed by Gov. Rick Scott requires those involved in motor vehicle crashes to seek treatment within 14 days, allows up to $10,000 in benefits for emergency medical conditions and $2,500 for non-emergency conditions. Scott and state Chief Financial Officer Jeff Atwater championed the 2012 reforms to reduce fraud in auto insurance, which they say costs motorists almost $1 billion a year through the increased costs of coverage.

The alternative is to replace the system with bodily-injury insurance, which could put more questions of medical coverage into the courts as injured parties seek to recoup expenses from at-fault motorists.

A bodily-injury insurance system is the most likely PIP alternative if further change is sought. This would push more medical coverage questions into the courts, since injured parties would seek to establish fault for expense reimbursement purposes.

If PIP is eliminated, Wetherell notes, challengers to the law would face a similar economic impact and future.

In March, Leon County Circuit Judge Terry Lewis sided with the challenge to sections of the law, criticizing it for depriving individuals of getting the medical care that they need.

Adam Levine, an attorney representing the FL PIP Defense Fund, praised Lewis for considering issues bigger than economic impacts, but Florida Solicitor General Allen Winsor said Lewis failed to determine that the law is unconstitutional.

The insurance industry has generally supported the changes to the law.

Reform efforts are being delayed as a result of the injunction, according to Donovan Brown, state government relations counsel for the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America.

“In order to address fraud and abuse within Florida’s no-fault auto insurance system and provide Floridians relief from being the number one state in the nation for questionable auto claims, it is imperative that consumers receive the benefit of the PIP reforms becoming fully effective,” Brown said in The News Service of Florida article.

Filed under Uncategorized

PIP Legislative Calendar Governs EUO Requirements

Florida insurers are now being forced to navigate between sometimes conflicting rulings on Examinations Under Oath (“EUO”) based on pre- and post-2012 changes to the PIP/No-Fault laws.

Insurance companies and their defense law firms were disappointed when the Florida Supreme Court ruled in late June that GEICO could not withhold benefits to a policyholder in a pre-2012 auto case based on the policyholder’s unwillingness to attend an EUO.

In the matter Merly Nunez v. GEICO General Insurance Company, the Florida Supreme Court was asked by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to rule on, “[w]hether, under FLA. STAT. § 627.736, an insurer can require an insured to attend an [examination under oath] as a condition precedent to recovery of [personal injury protection] benefits?”

The Court’s answer was in the negative, in a split 5-2 vote. The majority ruled that, “[t]he Florida No-Fault statute is mandatory and does not recognize such a condition. It is therefore invalid and contrary to the statutory terms.”

“Swift and virtually automatic payment” is the primary intent of PIP laws, notes the majority. While GEICO argued the need for fraud prevention and claims investigations, the Court viewed these actions as contrary to a fast case resolution.

The majority opinion was written by Justice Perry, with Justices Pariente, Lewis, Quince, and Labarga concurring. Justice Canady wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Polston concurred.

“Insurers have relied on the discretionary use of examinations under oath (EUOs) in appropriate cases to obtain relevant, needed information not only for the assessment of claimed losses, but for the prevention of fraud and abuse of the PIP system,” said Donovan Brown, Florida counsel and regional manager for the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America as quoted in an Insurance Journal article. “This ruling is another blow to Florida’s consumers in the fight against PIP fraud because the ruling further exposes consumers to the rampant PIP fraud that has plagued the Florida auto insurance system for far too long.”

Florida Governor Rick Scott approved changes to the state’s PIP statutes in May, 2012. As of January 1, 2013, insureds must now comply with all terms of a No-Fault policy, including any requirement to submit to an Examination Under Oath.

Click on the link to read the Supreme Court of Florida ruling in Merly Nunez v. GEICO General Insurance Company, No. SC12-650, dated June 27, 2013.

Filed under Uncategorized